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NEPA AS A MEANS TO PRESERVE AND IMPROVE
THE ENVIRONMENT-THE SUBSTANTIVE
REVIEW'
GRIN. G. BRIGGS*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article is based on the hypothesis that Congress enacted
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),I as it has
said, to "encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man
and his environment,"2 and not to mandate an exercise in the
niceties of preparing perfect environmental impact statements. In
the process of an overall advocation of the position that NEPA is
exclusively and significantly a means to attain the end of environ-
mentally sound federal decisions, this article will first illustrate how
the new Guidelines for the Preparation of Environmental Impact
Statements (the Guidelines) 3 promulgated by the Council on En-
vironmental Quality (CEQ) affect the impact statement process in a
regulatory agency, and will then discuss the latest developments in
the legal saga of the substantive review under NEPA.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 sets forth its
purpose as being
Rjo declare a national policy which will encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the
understanding of the ecological systems and natural re-
sources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council
on Environmental Quality. 4
This policy is implemented through section 102(2)(C), which requires
t The author wishes to aacknowledge and give thanks for the research and editorial
assistance given to him by Ms. Consuelo L, Kertz, honor student, class of 1975, Emory Law
School.
• Regional Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency, Region IV; B.S., Bob Jones
University, 1964; J.D,, University of South Carolina, 1967; LL.M., George Washington
University, 1971. Although this article was written by Mr. Briggs while serving as Regional
Counsel, no official support or endorsement by the Environmental Protection Agency is
intended or should be inferred.
1 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq, (1970).
2
 42 U,S.C. § 4321 (1970).
3 CEQ Guidelines for the Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 38 Fed.
Reg. 20,550 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines],
4 42 U. S. C.	 4321 (1970).
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an environmental impact statement to be written for every major
federal action significantly affecting the environment. The section
provides that all agencies of the federal government shall
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement
of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented. 5
The Council on Environmental Quality, which oversees the im-
plementation of NEPA, 6 has recently promulgated new Guidelines
for Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, both to aid
federal agencies in complying with NEPA and to assist the public
with its important participatory role under the Act. 7
II. PREPARATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT (EIS)
A. What Kind of Action Requires a Statement
Stated in simple, unbureaucratic terms, the impact statement
process consists of three basic steps:
(1) Draft environmental impact statements are circulated
to other Federal, State, and local agencies and are
made available to the public in accordance with the
provisions of these guidelines;
(2) Comments of the agencies and the public are consid-
ered; and
(3) Final environmental impact statements, responsive to
the comments received, are issued. 8
5
 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
6
 The Council on Environmental Quality was authorized by the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970), and was created by Exec. Order No, 11,514, 3 C.F.R. §
902 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
7
 Guidelines, supra note 3.
8
 Id. § 1500.2, at 20,550.
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Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires that all federal agencies must
prepare impact statements for all "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 9 In
the new CEQ Guidelines an attempt has been made to provide some
guidance to the federal agencies in defining "major Federal actions"
and in defining. "significantly affecting" in light of the case law on
the meaning and scope of this phrase. 1 ° The types of actions covered
by the Act include:
(1) Recommendations or favorable reports relating to•
legislation including requests for appropriations. . . .
(2) New and continuing projects and program activi-
ties: directly [or indirectly providing financial assis-
tance] . .
	 .
(3) The making, modification, or establishment of regula-
tions, rules, procedures, and policy."
B. Capsule of Content Requirements for EIS
Section 1500.8 of the Guidelines in part requires that the follow-
ing points must be thoroughly addressed in the EIS:
(1.) A description of the proposed action, a statement of
its purposes, and a description of the environment
affected, including information, summary technical
data, and maps and diagrams where relevant, ade-
quate to permit an assessment of potential environ-
mental impact by commenting agencies and the public
9
 42 U.S.C, § 4332 (1970)•
" Guidelines, supra note 3, at 20,551-52. The Guidelines summarize this point as
follows:
The words "major" and "significantly" are intended to imply thresholds of impor-
tance and impact that must be met before a statement is required. The action
causing the impact must also be one where there is sufficient Federal control and
responsibility to constitute "Federal action" in contrast to cases where such Federal •
control and responsibility are not present as, for example, when Federal funds are
distributed in the form of general revenue 'sharing to be used by State and local
governments (see § 1500.5(ii)). Finally, the, action must be one that significantly
affects the quality of the human environment either by directly affecting human
beings or by indirectly affecting human beings through adverse effects on the
environment.
Id.
11
 Id. § 1500.5. For a thorough discussion of what type of action necessitates an impact
statement, see Seeley, The National Environmental Policy Act; A Guideline for Compliance,
26 Vand. L. Rev. 295 (1973); F. Anderson, NEPA in the Courts 56-105 (1973). See also Kross,
Preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement, 44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 81, 84-86, 87-88
(1972).
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(2.) The relationship of the proposed action to land use
plans, policies, and controls for the affected area. . . .
(3.) The probable impact of the proposed action on the
environment . 	 . [including an assessment of] the
positive and negative effects of the proposed action
. . . [and] indirect, as well as ... direct, consequences
for the environment . . . .
(4.) Alternatives to the proposed action, including, where
relevant, those not within the existing authority of the
responsible agency. . .
(5.) Any piobable adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided . . .
(6.) The relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and en-
hancement of long-term productivity . . . [including] a
brief discussion of the extent to which the proposed
action involves tradeoffs between short-term en-
vironmental gains at the expense of long-term losses,
or vice versa . . .	 •
(7.) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources that would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented. . . .
(S.) An indication of what other interests and consid-
erations of Federal policy are thought• to offset the
adverse environmental effects of the proposed, action .
12
.	 .	 .
C. Recent Changes in the EIS Procedure
Most of the judicial gloss applied to NEPA during the past
three years has interpreted section 102(2)(C) as requiring full dis-
closure of the environmental consequences of the proposed federal
action. Many cases, in addition to recognizing NEPA's requirement
that federal agencies prepare impact statements which meet the full
disclosure standard, have implied into the Act a requirement that
the agency decisions must reflect a serious consideration of the
environmental consequences of the proposed action as those conse-
quences have been identified and discussed in the relevant impact
statement. t 3 The current CEQ Guidelines incorporate most of this
12 Guidelines, supra note 3, at 20,553-54.
13 See Sierra Club v. Froehlke (Kickapoo River Project), 5 E.R.C. 1920 (7th Cir. 1973);
Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 4 E.R.C. 2039 (4th Cir. 1973); Committee
for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 786-87, 3 E.R.C. 1126, 1128 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1114-15, 2 E.R.C. 1779 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally Cohen & Warren, Judicial Recogni-
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judicial gloss, as can be seen in the following review of the changes
in the Guidelines.
One interesting change in the current CEQ Guidelines is an
omission. The interim Guidelines of April 1971 specifically exempted
the regulatory activities of the Enyironmental Protection Agency
(EPA) from the requirements of the NEPA impact statement pro-
cess: "Because of the Act's legislative history, environmentally pro-
tective regulatory activities concurred in or taken by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency are not deemed actions which require the
preparation of environmental statements under section 102(2)(C) of
the Act.""
The new Guidelines, section 1500.1(a) and section 1500.4, refer
to the activities of all agencies of the federal government and
thereby imply that the EPA's original exemption no longer exists. In
part, the omission of an exemption for the EPA's regulatory ac-
tivities is due to ambiguity as to whether Congress intended the
EPA to be subject to NEPA. The EPA was not in existence at
the time NEPA was passed by Congress and it is unclear from the
legislative history whether Congress intended it to be subject to
NEPA." A similar ambiguity is seen, for example, in the area of
water pollution control. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
provides in part:
Except for the provision of;Federal financial assistance
for the purpose of assisting the construction of publicly
owned treatment works as authorized by section 1281 of
this title, and the issuance of a permit under section 1342
of this title for the discharge of any pollutant by a new
source as defined in section 1316 of this title, no action of
the Administrator taken pursuant to this chapter shall be
deemed a major Federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment within the meaning of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 . . . . 16
There are some aspects of water pollution control, then, that are
specifically included and some that are specifically excluded from
NEPA. By way of analogy this disparity could support either of the
lion of the Substantive Requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13
B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 685 (1972); Landau, A Postscript to Calvert Cliffs', 13 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev, 705 (1972).
" Statements on Proposed Federal Actions Affecting the Environment § 5(d), 36 Fed.
Reg, 7725 (1974
1 .1 For a full discussion of this point, see F. Anderson, supra note 11, at 116-22. The
omission was intentional, apparently for the purpose of encouraging the EPA to include
regulatory functions within the definition of "major federal actions."
16 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (Supp, TI 1972).
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conflicting conclusions that the EPA must be given a specific man-
date to include a specific program into the definition of "major
Federal action" or that without a specific exclusion, all EPA pro-
grams are included.
The courts do not seem to - share the CEQ's hesitancy to exempt
the EPA's regulatory programs from the impact statement process.
In a recent decision, Portland Cement Assn v. Ruckelshaus," the
District of Columbia Circuit, unwilling to exempt all EPA protective•
activity from the requirements of NEPA, found a "functional equi-
valent of a NEPA impact statement" 18 in the requirements of sec-
tion 111 of the Clean Air Act of 1970) 9
In addition, the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court decision
which would have required the EPA to prepare an EIS before
promulgating sulphur emission standards. In Anaconda Co. v.
Ruckelshaus," while interpreting the Clean Air Act, the appellate
court decided that the district court lacked jurisdiction because of
the nature of the administrative decision-making process. Howeve'r,
the court, in stating that the contention that the EPA must file an
impact statement was without merit, said: "To compel the filing of
impact statements could only serve to frustrate the accomplishment
of the Act's objectives."21
The definitive word on whether the EPA's regulatory activities
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act are exempt from the
impact statement process may have come recently from Congress.
During the Senate debate on the appropriation of $5,000,000 "for
the preparation of environmental impact statements as required by
section 102(2)(C) [of. NEPA] on all proposed actions by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, except where prohibited by law," 22 sev-
eral Senators discussed the "settled relationship" of NEPA and
regulatory activities of the EPA. 23 The special funds are intended to
be expended only where the agency is required by law to prepare
17 5 E.R.C. 1593 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
19
 Id. at 1598. See also International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 3
E.L.R. 20,133 (D.C. Cir.. 1973), in which the court rejected an auto company's argument that
a decision on emission controls required an impact statement. The decision was already
"infused with environmental considerations so pertinent to Congress in designing the statutory
framework." Id. at 650 n.130, 3 E.L.R. at 20,149. Accord, Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,
477 F.2d 495, 5 E.R.C. 1222 (4th Cir. 1973).
19 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(b)(1)(B) - (1970), which provides in part that "[t]he'Administrator
shall afford interested persons an opportunity for written comment on such proposed regula-
tions. After considering such comments, he shall promulgate, within 90 days after such
publication, such standards with such modifications as he deems appropriate."
211 482 F.2d 1301, 5 E.R.C. 1673 (10th Cir. 1973), rev'g 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo.
1972).
21 482 F.2d at 1306, 5 E.R.C. at 1675.
22 119 Cong. Rec. 18,976 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1973).
23
 See, e.g., id. (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
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impact statements. Senator Muskie summed up the EPA's responsi-
bility: •
Under existing statutory and case law, the only instances
wherein the EPA is required to prepare environmental
impact statements are in connection with the making of
waste treatment construction grants and the issuance of
discharge permits for new water pollution sources under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Section 511(c)(1)
and the legislative history of that act clearly state that all of
the provisions of NEPA are to apply to those two specific
activities. Except for ,that narrow extension of NEPA's
coverage authorized under section 511(c)(1), the Congress
has never wavered from the intention expressed in enacting
NEPA that the legislative mandates of the environmental
improvement agencies—now EPA—were not to be
changed in any way by NEPA. 24
Another significant point in the new Guidelines is the emphasis
on public participation found in the policy statement, section
1500.2(a)(2), 25 and the section on preparing the draft impact state-
ments and public hearings, section 1500.7. 26 In addition, there
emerges an increased emphasis on building sound environmental
considerations into the decision-making process. The CEQ
Guidelines call for "beginning at the earliest possible point, an
appropriate and careful consideration of the environmental aspects
of proposed action in order that adverse environmental effects may
be avoided or minimized and environmental quality previously lost
may be restored."27 This is, of course, a recognition by the CEQ of
ithe importance of involving the public in fundamental decisions
which will affect the quality of life, of the significance of the legisla-
tive intent in enacting NEPA, and of the Act's judicial gloss. But,
more importantly, there is a recognition that agency decisions must
take into account environmental aspects "at the earliest possible
point." The Congress intended "actions" to mean not only actual
construction, but also "project proposals, proposals for new legisla-
tion, regulations, policy statements or expansion or revision of ongo-
ing programs." 28
24 Id. at 18,976-77 (remarks of Sen. Muskie). For further discussion as well as opposing
views, see 119 Cong. Rec. 8305-08 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1973); Halfway There: EPA's "En-
vironmental Explanations" and the Duty to File Impact Statements, 3 E.L.R. 10,139-42
(1973); EPA's Responsibilities Under the National Environmental Policy Act: Further De-
velopments, 3 E.L.R. 10,157 (1973).
25 Guidelines, supra note 3, at 20,550.
26 Id. at 20,553-54.
17
 Id. § 1500.1(a), at 20,550.
28 NEPA, Legislative History, S. Rep. No, 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1969). For a
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The timing of the impact statement must be "late enough in the
development process to contain meaningful information, but . .
early enough so that whatever information is contained can practi-
cally serve as input into the decision making process."29 An example
of a mandatory EIS at the early stage of the development is pre-
sented in Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. Atomic
Energy Commission. 3° The District of Columbia Circuit in Scien-
tists' Institute required that the Commission prepare an impact
statement for one of its special research and development programs.
The court reasoned that NEPA applied to both individual construc-
tion projects and large-scale development plans. Because the total
program would require vast expenditures of money and would
influence the course of electric power generation for years to come,
the court felt it was essential to consider the environmental factors
early in the process. 31 The CEQ Guidelines recognize such a com-
mitment of funds to "projects and program activities"32 and require
an early EIS when the federal action is a major one which will
significantly affect the environment."
An interesting side issue in section 1500.5 of the Guidelines
portends further court interpretation. This section specifically in-
cludes, as action requiring an EIS, projects and program activities
supported in whole or in part through "Federal contracts, grants,
subsidies, loans or other forms of funding assistance (except where
such assistance is solely in the form of general revenue sharing
funds . . .)."34 This approach is particularly interesting in view of
the decision in Ely v. Velde. 35 In Ely the Fourth Circuit held that
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration must comply with
NEPA in allocating to the State of Virginia federal funds under the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act even though this act
prohibits federal interference with a state's use of such funds. 36 On
the other hand, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that NEPA
applied to the farm subsidy program, noting:
- Payment of the subsidies is mandatory under the Ag-
ricultural Act of 1970. The recipient is free to use the
discussion of the intended scope of NEPA as well as the timing of NEPA statements, see
Note, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 802 (1972).
29 Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d
1079, 1094, 5 E.R.C. 1418, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
39 481 F.2d 1079, 5 E.R.C. 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
31 Id. at 1096-98, 5 E.R,C. at 1426.
32 Guidelines, supra note 3, § 1500.5(a)(2), at 20,551.
33 Id. § 1500.2, at 20,550.
34 Id. § 1500.5(a)(2), at 20,551 (emphasis added).
35 451 Fld 1130, 3 E.R.C. 1280 (4th Cir. 1971).
36 Id. at 1137, 1139, 3 E.R,C. at 1285, 1286.
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money in any way he sees fit. The fact that it (or other
money of the recipient) was put to a use affecting the
environment cannot convert that private use into federal
action. 37
The implication of such decisions as these may be that, despite the
CEQ's decision to exempt general revenue-sharing projects from the
EIS procedure, such exemption is far from accepted as settled; the
courts may resolve this issue by deciding at which level of govern-
ment ultimate control over the uses of the money will vest.
The CEQ Guidelines now also prevent a piecemeal avoidance
of NEPA by fragmenting programs into individual projects." The
new Guidelines emphasize the importance of considering the
cumulative impact of proposed actions on the environment. Thus,
an impact statement should be prepared if the cumulative impact of
several projects is significant, even though each individual project
would not warrant an impact statement. 39
Included in the CEQ Guidelines definition of "significant ef-
fects" are the "secondary effects," which are often overlooked in the
impact statement process; these vary with the nature of the project,
but must take into account growth characteristics of an area and
population patterns." This factor is particularly important in the
consideration of any "adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided (such as water or air pollution, undesirable land use pat-
terns, damage to life systems, urban congestion, threats to health or
other consequences adverse to the environmental goals set out in
section 101(b) of the Act [NEPA].)" 41 Such language often evokes
images of rural environments—e.g., fields, streams, forests—but the
Second Circuit in Hanly v. Mitchell42 issued a reminder that urban
environments also merit protection. In considering the impact of a
proposed new courthouse and jail in a mixed business-residential
section of Manhattan, the court noted:
The National Environmental Policy Act contains no ex-
haustive list of so-called "environmental considerations,"
but without question its aims extend beyond sewage and
37 King's County Ass'n v. Hardin, 5 E.R.C. 1383, 1384 (9th Cir. 1973).
3° Sierra Club v. Froehlke (Trinity Project), 359 F. Supp. 1289, 5 E.R,C. 1033 (S.D.
Tex. 1973).
Guidelines, supra note 3, §§ 1500.6(a), .8, at 20,551-52, 20,553-54.
4° Id. * 1500.8(a)(3), at 20,553.
41 Id. § 1500.8(a)(5), at 20,554.
4 ' 460 F.2d 640, 647, 4 E.R.C. 1152, 1157 (2d Cir. 1972). In support of its proposition
the court cites Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 3 E.R.C. 1280 (4th Cir. 1971), which concerned
the construction of a correctional facility in a historic section of Virginia, and Goose Hollow
Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 3 E.R.C. 1087 (D. Ore. 1971), which
concerned the impact on a neighborhood of a high-rise apartment building.
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garbage and even beyond water and air pollution. . . . The
Act [section 101(a)] must be construed to include protection
of the quality of life for city residents. Noise, traffic, over-
burdened mass transportation systems, crime, congestion
and even availability of drugs all affect the urban "envi-
ronment" and are surely results of the "profound influences
of . . . high-density urbanization [and] industrial
expansion. "43
The CEQ Guidelines, in response to judicial mandate, em-
phasize the importance of detailed consideration of alternatives to a
proposed action." In particular, there is an increased emphasis on
the alternatives of either taking no action or postponing action. In
addition to the section of the Guidelines which requires an agency to
consider "[a]lternatives . . . including, where relevant, those not
within the existing authority of the responsible agency," 45 there is an
accent on the interdisciplinary approach required by section
102(2)(a) of NEPA. Section 1500.8(c) of the Guidelines requires
agencies to "[a]ttempt to have relevant disciplines represented on
their own staffs; where this is not feasible they should make appro-
priate use of relevant Federal, State, and local agencies or the profes-
sional services of universities and outside consultants."'" The
Guidelines also emphasize that this approach should be used at the
early planning stages of the proposed action, as discussed earlier in
this article. 47
 The interdisciplinary approach to EIS planning and
preparation is required for the purpose of insuring the "integrated
use of the natural and social sciences" so as to assure a "systematic
evaluation of reasonable alternative courses of action and their
potential, economic, and environmental consequences." 48
The question of the need for the consideration of alternatives
outside the authority of the implementing agency was discussed in
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton." The Secre-
43
 460 F.2d at 647, 4 E.R.C. at 1157, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970). But see
Maryland Planning Comm'n v. Postal Serv., 5 E.R.C. 1719 (D.C. Cir. 1973). There the court
stated that the type of land-use environmental effects which zoning regulation addresses
"cannot fairly be projected as having been within the contemplation of Congress" when it
passed NEPA. 5 E.R.C. at 1724.
44
 In the Policy Section, § 1500.2, the Guidelines emphasize: "In particular, agencies
should use the environmental impact statement process to explore alternative actions that will
avoid or minimize adverse impacts . . ;" and § 1500.8(a)(4) requires consideration of
"lailternatives to the proposed action, including, where relevant, those not within the existing
authority of the responsible agency." Guidelines, supra note 3, at 20,550, 20,554.
45
 Id. § 1500.8(a)(4), at 20,554.
46 Id.
47
 See text at note 27 supra.
48
 Guidelines, supra note 3, at 20,554.
46
 337 F. Supp. 170, 3 E.R.C. 1623 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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tary of the Interior made plans to issue oil and gas leases on the
continental shelf of Louisiana. An impact statement which had been
prepared was found inadequate on grounds of its having failed to
include all reasonable alternatives to the proposa1. 5° Notwithstand-
ing the fact that some of the alternatives, including the need for
foreign policy decisions and legislative determinations, were beyond
the Department's control, the court said that some discussion of
these options was essential in order to inform the decision-makers in
the executive and legislative branches of their existence. 51 Two
major NEPA issues which have been resolved by the courts are
what kinds of federal actions require the preparation of an impact
statement and what are the basic elements which go into an ade-
quate impact statement. Major changes in the CEQ Guidelines have
resulted in placing more emphasis on public participation in the
preparation of impact statements, early recognition of the need for
impact statements, consideration of secondary effects of proposed
actions, detailed consideration of all feasible alternatives, and a
broader interdisciplinary approach to evaluation of proposed
actions. 52
III. SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW UNDER NEPA
The issue of substantive review under NEPA has been raised
succinctly in a recent treatise:
The courts stand on the threshold of an important new
chapter in NEPA's judicial interpretation. Perhaps they
will be content with a general review of compliance with
§ 101; its broad language may discourage extensive de-
tailed interpretation. On the other hand, Calvert Cliffs'
vague requirement that agencies "consider" and balance
environmental factors may not prescribe a decision-making
process that can obtain the rather explicit results desired by
Congress when it enacted NEPA. If the courts cannot
s° Id. at 171, 3 E.R.C. at 1623.
51
 Accord, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F,2d 289, 4
E.R.C. 1721 (8th Cir. 1972). But see Landau, supra note 11, at 716-17, for the conclusion that
executive privilege may be exercised when matters of national defense are involved. In
addition, Roger Crompton and Richard Berg discuss the function of substantive elements and
judicial review in an interesting article, Crompton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water:
NEPA & The Federal Bureaucracy, 71 U. Mich. L. Rev. 511 (1973). They make the point
that NEPA has had the intended effect of making decision-making more responsive to
environmental considerations and has tended to offset the one-concept agency decision. Id. at
514-17.
52
 For an exhaustive review of the various procedural questions under NEPA, see Sierra
Club v. Froehlke (Trinity Project), 359 F. Supp. 1289, 5 E.R.C. 1033 (S.D. Tex. 1973), and
the recently published treatise, F, Anderson, NEPA in the Courts (1973).
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effectively review agency compliance with NEPA's basic
purposes, they may become impatient with repeated re-
views of procedural compliance and cursory substantive
reviews, and begin to interpret § 101 and § 102(1) in ways
which more precisely define the allowable scope of agency
discretion. 53
This article now turns. to a consideration of a possible new judicial
posture on the scope of review of agency decision-making under
NEPA, and it should be noted that the task of establishing clearly
defined parameters of the substantive review may take as long as it
has taken to bring some clarity to the scope of the procedural
review. However, advocacy of a substantive review is not tan-
tamount to a statement that NEPA confers upon the courts the
power to prohibit proposed projects simply because there has been a
minimal failure to comply with either procedural or substantive
provisions of the Act. 54
The courts have been struggling with the distinction between
the procedural and substantive requirements of NEPA since its
inception. At the root of the difficulty is the question of the extent to
which federal agencies must incorporate environmental factors into
their decision-making processes and the question of implementation
of section 101. The courts' reactions to the interrelationships of
sections 101 and 102 are diverse." At this point it is valuable to
examine some of the kinds of decisions that courts have been mak-
ing when considering the substantive requirements of NEPA and to
attempt to extract the most consistent interpretation of the standard
for the NEPA substantive review. .
A leading case on the question of NEPA's substantive require-
53
 F. Anderson, supra note 52, at 265 (emphasis added).
54
 This unacceptable elevation of the means over the end was however, advocated in a
recent scholarly article. The authors of this article, Cohen and Warren, advocate rather
vehemently the position that NEPA creates major substantive environmental rights which can
only be protected by a case-by-case, exhaustive review pursuant to a standard which creates a
presumption against an agency decision which is called into question by environmentalists.
Briefly stated, the Cohen-Warren substantive review standard is:
Regardless of the final resolution of this question of individual environmental rights,
NEPA does create, at the very least, a right to require compliance by the federal
government with all of the Act's operative provisions. This right is one "which citizen
groups, functioning as private attorneys general, have ,standing .to protect in the
public interest."
Cohen ,& Warren, Judicial Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 685, 688 (1972) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
55
 An extensive discussion of the case law on these two sections appears in F. Anderson,
supra note 52, at 246 et seq.
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ments is Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy
Commission. 56 There the court rejected the idea that mechanical
compliance with procedure on the part of agencies would suffice.
"[T]he requirement of environmental consideration 'to the fullest
extent possible' sets a high standard for the agencies, a standard
which must be rigorously enforced by the reviewing courts."" The
court went on to say that the decision of any agency must include
good faith consideration of the environment, and stated further that
"reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on
its merits . . . unless it be shown that the actual balance of costs and
benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient
weight to environmental issues."'"
In a recent Wisconsin case, Farwell v. Brinegar, 59 the district
court was requested to review the environmental impact statement
for the construction of a highway from Dodgeville to Mt. Horeb,
Wisconsin. The judge rejected the EIS on grounds of procedural
inadequacy. Relying heavily on the reasoning of Calvert Cliffs', he
noted that he had only "minimal substantive review within [his]
authority."60 He insisted that "this court cannot reverse a substan-
tive decision on the merits unless plaintiffs demonstrate that the
actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck by the agency
was clearly arbitrary and capricious, providing insufficient weight to
environmental values."61
A limited substantive review was made in Scenic Hudson Pre-
servation Conference v. FPC, 62 in which the court accepted an FPC
decision to allow a pumped-storage reservoir to be constructed in the
scenic area of Storm King Mountain. The Second Circuit said:
Where the Commission has considered all relevant
factors, and where the challenged findings, based on such
full consideration, are supported by substantial evidence,
we will not allow our personal views as to the desirability
56
 449 F.2d 1109, 2 E.R.C. 1779 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972).
57
 449 F.2d at 1114, 2 E.R.C. at 1782. See also Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F.
Supp. 404, 5 E.R.C. 1283 (W.D. Va. 1973), where the court applied the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard while approving of an action by the Corps of Engineers as not being "a
clear error of judgment." The court defined its rule as being "not only to see that government
agencies have complied with all the procedural requirements, but also to engage insubstan-
tial inquiry' to determine 'whether there has been a clear error of judgment.' " Id. at 410, 5
E.R,C. at 1286. Courts are allowed to delve into the decision-making process on their own to
determine if the agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious.
55
 449 F.2d at 1115, 2 E.R.C. at 1783 (emphasis added).
" 5 E.R.C. 1939 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
6°
 Id. at 1948.
61 Id.
62
 453 F.2d 463, 3 E.R.C. 1232 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S, 926 (1972).
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of the result reached by the Commission to influence us in
our decision. 63
There have been a few cases in which a court has been willing
to state or imply that if a decision were unsound it could be judi-
cially changed even though all relevant factors were considered by
the deciding agency." On the other hand, an inference can be
drawn from a number of cases" that some courts have given the
procedural requirements of NEPA a very strict interpretation for the
purposes of finding government agencies' decisions to be "arbitrary
and capricious," when in all likelihood the fact has been that such
courts have simply disagreed with the EIS decision. In Sierra Club
v. Froehlke (Trinity Project), 66
 a federal district court found that an
EIS contained numerous deficiencies. After considering the evidence
presented as to the true character and purposes of the Wallisville
portion of the Trinity Project, which constituted the subject of the
relevant EIS, the court said:
[T]he existing Wallisville environmental impact statement
is insufficient under NEPA, since it lacks the requisite
detail and fails to satisfy the full disclosure requirements of
the Act. Alternatives to the present project are inade-
quately considered, and there is no indication that genuine
efforts have been made to mitigate any of the major im-
pacts on the environment resulting from the construction of
the project. 67
In National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant," a case
concerning the Chicod Creek channelization project, the court found
the impact statement inadequate in that it did not make "full and
accurate disclosure of the environmental effects of the proposed
action and alternatives to such action . . ."69
 While saying that it
would not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or
agency, the court reasoned: "The Court's function is to determine
whether the environmental effects of the proposed action and
reasonable alternatives are sufficiently disclosed, discussed, and that
conclusions are substantiated by supportive opinion and data." 7 °
63
 453 F.2d at 468, 3 E.R.C. at 1235-36.
64
 See, e.g., Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 4 E.R.C. 2039 (4th Cir.
1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 4 E.R.C. 1941 (5th Cir, 1973).
63
 See text at notes 66-70 infra.
66 359 F. Supp, 1289, 5 E.R.C. 1033 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
67
 Id. at 1384, 5 E.R.C. at 1097.
68
 355 F. Supp. 280, 5 E.R.C. 1001 (E.D.N.C. 1973).
69
 Id. at 286, 5 E.R.C. at 1004.
79 Id.
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The NEPA substantive review received strong support from the
Eighth Circuit in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Engineers. 7 ' In this case the court reviewed the EIS for the Gillham
Dam on the Cassatot River in Arkansas and, while holding that the
EIS decision was not arbitrary, concluded that NEPA very clearly
imposes on the federal agencies a responsibility to comply with the
substantive provisions as much as it requires compliance with sec-
tion 102(2)(C). 72 The Eighth Circuit said:
The unequivocal intent . of the NEPA is to require
agencies to consider and give effect to the environmental
goals set forth in the Act, not just to file detailed impact
studies which will fill governmental archives.
The application of the substantive principles of NEPA
is to be made by the agency through "a careful and in-
formed decision-making process." The agency must give
environmental factors consideration along with economic
and technical factors. "To 'consider' the former 'along with'
the latter must involve a balancing process."
Given an agency obligation to carry out the substan-
tive requirements of the Act, we believe that courts have
an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the
merits. 73
A recent NEPA case which discusses the substantive review
question, National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 74 stands adamantly
opposed to a substantive review of the impact statement and fails to
address the question of reviewability of the EIS decision. The deci-
sion of the Tenth Circuit says that section 102(2)(C) is the sole
criterion for testing the adequacy of the impact statement. 75 This
decision stands in stark contrast to the district court decision it
reversed. 76 Although not having to rule specifically on the decision
of the Secretary of the Interior to dispense with the helium conserva-
tion program, the district court said in reviewing the EIS that the
impact statement is "appallingly deficient in a number of respects"
and "blatantly misdescribes the actual effect of the proposed
action. "77
71
 470 F.2d 289, 4 E.R.C. 1721 (8th Cir. 1.972).
72 Id. at Z97-98, 301, 4 E.R.C. at 1726-28.
73
 Id. at 298, 4 E.R.C. at 1726 (citations omitted).
74
 6 E.R.C. 1001 (10th Cir. 1973).
75 Id. at 1004-05.
76 361 F. Supp. 78, 5 E.R.C. 1545 (D. Kan. 1973).
77
 Id. at 99, 5 E.R.C. at 1558. Also, the district court, in dictum, expressed support for
the principle of substantive review:
Based upon the clear language of NEPA, its implementing provisions, its
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It should be noted that the Tenth Circuit in National Helium
refused to reconsider the EIS decision and limited its review of the
district court decision to a consideration of the adequacy of the
impact statement and the standard for that review." In discussing
the appropriate standard for review of the EIS, the court noted that
a distinction should be made between the "arbitrary or capricious"
standard for review of agency action and the standard for review of
the EIS with regard to procedural compliance with NEPA. The
court stated its view:
The rule of reason is a more appropriate standard where
the sufficiency of the statement is being tested.
In summary, then, our view is that the review of the
FES [Final Environmental Statement] is limited to the
following:
(1) Whether the FES discusses all of the five
procedural requirements of NEPA.
(2) Whether the environmental impact
statement constitutes an objective good faith
compliance with the demands of NEPA.
(3) Whether the statement contains a reason-
able discussion of the subject matter involved in
the five required areas. 79
It is submitted that the NEPA questions would be much easier
to answer if the district courts, in cases such as National Helium and
Corps of Engineers, would be more willing to review the EIS deci-
sion directly, acknowledging such consideration openly as a substan-
tive review rather than resorting to the circuitous alternative of
discrediting it by means of a scathing attack on the procedural
adequacy of the EIS supporting the decision.
legislative history, the many cases interpreting its import, and the underlying policy
which it was intended to foster, it is clear that the mere formal filing of a document,
in and of itself, does not satisfy the Act's substantive and procedural mandates or
preclude further inquiry by judicial review. As noted in the recent Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (1972):
"Reading the Act and its legislative history together, there is little doubt that
Congress intended all agencies under their authority to follow the substantive and
procedural mandates of NEPA. .. . Compliance with NEPA is more than a mere
ritual • • ."
Id. at 96, 5 E.R.C. at 1556 (emphasis in the original) (citation omitted). With this language
the district court has confused the substantive review of the decision with the procedural
review of the EIS, a distinction which is not always recognized by other courts.
78 6 E.R.C. at 1005.
79
 Id. (footnote omitted).
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IV. PROPOSED FUTURE STANDARD
A. Summary
The review of the EIS decision on its merits for substantive
compliance represents the current cutting-edge of the NEPA sword
and has developed only recently. As late as January 1973, it was still
unclear whether the courts would extend their substantive review
beyond the question of whether the impact statement was properly
reflected in the decision; it still is not a settled issue whether or not
they ought to. A former Regional Counsel for the EPA has observed:
If a statement reveals the probability of substantial
environmental degradation from a major action, does
NEPA preclude the continuation of , the project? Although
some have argued that the Act imposes substantive limita-
tions on federal activities that injure the environment, the
courts have concluded that NEPA requires compliance
with its procedures, but that it does not restrict substantive
project choices."
Three alternatives for the ultimate test of the EIS and the
decision regarding it have emerged: (1) a simple procedural require-
ment of filing a statement which discusses the environmental issues
and alternatives; (2) a substantive requirement that the environmen-
tal impact be a decisive factor in an agency decision; and (3) the
more recent test that the EIS decision must meet the substantive
requirements of NEPA. A summary of the judicial interpretation of
the content requirements for impact statements, albeit difficult, is
helpful in developing an appreciation of the trend of the courts
toward finding in NEPA a requirement for substantive review of the
EIS decision.
In the summary section of his treatise NEPA in the Courts,
Anderson made a commendable effort to state briefly the major
considerations in evaluating the EIS content:
The courts have measured the adequacy of the state-
ment itself by the standard of "full disclosure," which itself
is partially qualified by a "rule of reason" governing the
length and detail of the agency's investigations. .
When actually reviewing the contents of challenged
statements, the courts have elaborated the policy of full
disclosure into more specific requirements. They have said
" Seeley, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Guideline for Compliance, 26
Vand. L. Rev. 295, 297-98 (1973) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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that' statements must be understandable and nonconclus-
ory, that they must refer to the full range of knowledge,
and that they must discuss certain impacts which are typi-
cal of some types of action. Especially important is the use
made in the statement of responsible dissenting scientific
opinion . . . Further, even appropriate references to
supporting information may be inadequate where impor-
tant reasons exist for fuller disclosure of underlying logic
(e.g., public need, lack of specificity about alternatives,
etc.). 81
Recent decisions, however, make it clear that full procedural com-
pliance with NEPA is not enough. 82 A reading of the major cases
makes it clear that the courts have been careful to look beyond mere
compliance with the basic content requirements of the impact
statements. 83
B. Toward an Admittedly Substantive Review
Not only have the courts carefully reviewed agency impact
statements for procedural compliance with NEPA, but they have
also begun to extend that review to determine whether the agencies
are complying with the substantive provisions of NEPA. It seems
apparent that procedural gamesmanship which is required by deci-
sions like that of the district court in Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Engineers" would be unnecessary if the courts were
more willing to admit to judging the EIS decision substantively.
The substantive review test which is most reasonable and is
most in keeping with the intent of NEPA is the substantive review
articulated recently by the Seventh Circuit in Sierra Club v.
Froehlke (Kickapoo River Project). 85 The court was presented with
81
 F. Anderson, supra note 52, at 284.
82
 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.Zd 346, 4 E.R.C. 1829 (8th
Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 4 E.R.C.
1721 (8th Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 2 E.R.C. 1779 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
83
 See H. Yarrington, The National Environmental Policy Act, 4 BNA Env. Rptr. No.
36 (Monograph No. 17, 1974).
While the trend toward sustantive review of agency decisions to assure compliance
with the principles of Section 101 of NEPA appears to be well supported by recent
district court decisions, the split on the issue between the-various circuits cannot be
ignored. The question is not as yet finally resolved. Uncertainty on the question is
heightened further by the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari
in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers (Gillham Dam). Had the
Court taken the case, perhaps the divergence of views in the circuit courts might
have been resolved.
Id. at 39.
84 325 F. Supp. 749, 2 E.R.C. 1260 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
85
 5 E.R.C. 1920 (7th Cir. 1973).
716
NEPA AND THE SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW
the question of whether the environmental impact statement for a
flood control dam project in the Kickapoo River, Wisconsin, com-
plied with the mandates of NEPA. The plaintiffs specifically alleged
that "the district courts have an obligation to review substantive
agency decisions on the merits to determine if they are in accord
with NEPA." 86 After stating that the court agreed with the plaintiffs
that NEPA required a substantive review of the EIS decision, the
Seventh Circuit, quoting language from Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers," said: "After reviewing the
environmental impact statement prepared by the Corps, we are
convinced that the Corps 'reached its decision after a fair, good faith
consideration and balancing of environmental factors,' and that its
decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious." 88 This test admits to
being substantive but limits the review to the issue of whether the
EIS decision is arbitrary or capricious in light of the substantive
provisions of NEPA."
Many courts have cited Davis' treatise on Administrative Law 9 °
to justify the substantive review. 9 ' Professor Davis, in the volume in
which he had condensed his lengthier treatise, makes it clear that at
common law agency decisions are presumed to be reviewable except
in limited circumstances and that the common law was not effec-
tively changed by the Administrative Procedure Act; 92 he sum-
marizes the law on reviewability as follows:
Administrative action is generally reviewable unless
(a) legislative intent is discernable which favors unre-
viewability or (b) a special reason growing out of the sub-
ject matter or the circumstances calls for unreviewability.
With rare exceptions, the special reason is a belief that the
issues are inappropriate for judicial determination; in-
cluded in such issues are questions about foreign policy,
86 Id. at 1923.
R7 430 F.2d 289, 4 E.R.C. 1721 (8th Cir; 1972).
as 5 E.R.C. at 1924.
89
 After reviewing its own early decision in Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F,2d 1027, 4 E.R.C.
1435 (7th Cir. 1972), and recent decisions of other circuits, the Seventh Circuit in Sierra Club
v. Froehlke (Kickapoo River Project) said:
In light of these statements, we feel compelled to hold that an agency's decision
should be subjected to a review on the merits to determine if it is in accord with the
substantive requirements of NEPA. The review should be limited to determining
whether the agency's decision is arbitrary or capricious.
5 E. R. C . at 1924 (citations omitted).
9° K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958),
9
' See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1972);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 298, 4 E,R,C. 1721,
1726 (8th Cir.. 1972).
92 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
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military activities, and other specialized subjects which are
beyond the range of legal training. 93
The more important question is what standard of judicial re-
view should be .used to test the EIS decision. The Sierra Club v.
Froehlke 94
 test of "arbitrary or capricious" in light of the substantive
provisions of NEPA seems to.
 be the most precise -and most equitable
test and the one which conforms to the principles of agency review
discussed by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe. 95 In Overton Park, which was not inter-
preting NEPA, the Court noted that the Administrative Procedure
Act codified three primary standards for judicial review of agency
decisions. First, in any case agency action must be set aside if
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." 96
 Second, "[i]n certain narrow, specifically
limited situations, the agency action is to be set aside if the action
was not supported by 'substantial evidence.' "97 And third, "in other
equally narrow circumstances the reviewing court is to engage in a
de novo review of the action, and set it aside if it was 'unwarranted
by the facts.' "98
 Although some courts have applied the substantial
evidence test to NEPA99
 and others have confused a clear error in
judgment with the substantial evidence rule, 10° the Supreme Court
limited this rule's application: "Review under the substantial-
evidence test is authorized only when the agency action is taken
pursuant to a rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure
Act itself . . . or when the agency action is based on a public
adjudicatory hearing." 1 ° 1
In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 102
the Eighth Circuit specifically advocated both a procedural review
of the EIS and a substantive review of the EIS decision, and defined
its "arbitrary or capricious" test as a review of the decision, includ-
93
 K. Davis, Administrative Law 523 (1972).
94 5 E.R.C. at 1924.
95 401 U.S. 402 (1972).
96
 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970), quoted in 401 U.S. at 413-14.
97
 401 U.S. at 414.
98 Id.
99
 In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 3 E.R.C. 1232 (2d
Cir. 1972), the court applied the substantial evidence rule to the question of full consideration
of all relevant environmental factors. Id. at 468, 3 E.R.C. at 1235-36.
169
 In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 2
E.R.C. 1779 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court equated "arbitrary" with insufficient weight of
evidence, thus confusing the "arbitrary or capricious" standard with the substantial evidence
rule 449 F.2d at 1115.
101
 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1972) (citations
omitted). See also text at note 94 supra.
i" 470 F.2d 289, 4 E,R.C. 1721 (8th Cir. 1972).
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ing the consideration of all relevant factors, to determine whether
"the decision itself represented a clear error in judgment."'" The
Eighth Circuit was applying the arbitrary and capricious standard
of the Supreme Court as it was articulated in Overton Park, where
the Court explained the finding required pursuant to this standard:
To make this finding the court must consider whether the
decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment . .. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a
narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the agency. ' 04
It is respectfully submitted that all of the above standards are
more subjective and less definable than the clear substantive review
standard articulated in Sierra Club v. Froehlke. 105 Any standard
less precise than the Sierra Club v. Froehlke "arbitrary or caprici-
ous" test which is used to judge compliance with the substantive
provisions of NEPA may prove not only imperfect, but incom-
prehensible and thus wholly unviable. Anything less precise tends to
elevate the means above the end. The end is a preserved and
improved environment, not volumes and volumes of neatly pack-
aged impact statements.
Any decision to adopt the position supported by the largest
quantity of judicial decisions must necessarily lead to the conclusion
that there are two tests to be applied to the EIS and the EIS
decision: first, that of "full and accurate disclosure of information
required by § 102(2)(C);" 106 and second, that of "a review [of the
EIS decision] on the merits to determine if it is in accord with the
substantive requirements of NEPA." 1 °7 This latter test is a determi-
nation of "whether the agency's decision is arbitrary or
capricious."'" These tests are advanced in Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers and in Sierra Club v. Froehlke and
are supported substantially by numerous other cases.'"
If the courts fail to see NEPA solely as a means of achieving an
improved environment, they will continue to elevate the EIS process
to a loftier position than that which Congress intended it to have. If
1 ° 3 Id. at 300, 4 E.R.C. at 1728.
104 401 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted).
1 °5 5 E.R.C. at 1924.
1 ° 4 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d at 295, 4 E.R.C.
at 1723.
1 " Sierra Club v. Froehlke (Kickapoo River Project), 5 E.R.C. at 1924.
108 Id .
109 See text at notes 58-61 supra.
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the courts will face the fact that they are effectively reviewing the
EIS decision as well as the statement, the cases will be aimed
toward the end of preservation of our irreplaceable environment and
not at some mythical standard of a perfectly processed environmen-
tal impact statement. It is hoped that this article will encourage the
federal agencies and the courts to set as their goals environmentally
sound decisions based on the substantive requirements of NEPA.
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